’excused from the table’ of disability justice. Now is the time to earn back our place and join our voices together for the work of inclusion” (164). While some may be skeptical of the difference academic writing can make, this book urges us onward, holding us accountable to the cause of justice—especially for those whose dignity and flourishing remain in question.

MARCUS MESCHER
Xavier University


*Modern Virtue: Mary Wollstonecraft and a Tradition of Dissent* by Emily Dumler-Winckler is an ambitious text that simultaneously exegetes the thought of Mary Wollstonecraft, critiques Wollstonecraft scholarship, provides a substantive biography, engages contemporary discourses in Christian ethics, feminist ethics, and political theory, and argues that Wollstonecraft provides necessary interventions to those discourses. This book is oriented toward a scholarly audience, although one could certainly excerpt it for undergraduates in upper-level courses that touch on topics like virtue theory, modernity, Enlightenment philosophy, or religious and political dissent. There are already quite a few published reviews of Dumler-Winckler’s *Modern Virtue*, which nicely summarize her overall project in its dimensions as historical-political corrective to the genealogies of modernity from thinkers like MacIntyre and philosophical-theological corrective to both defenders and despisers of virtue ethics who, for very different reasons, see modern virtue “as a contradiction in terms” (314).

Given that, here I will focus on the virtues she identifies as modern and to which the title alludes by way of outlining the book. *Modern Virtue* proceeds in seven parts with five main chapters. The introduction is where Dumler-Winckler contextualizes Wollstonecraft within her own time as well as the way Wollstonecraft and her legacy are still at work within the present day, despite how she is often left out of most narratives of modernity, especially in theology and religious studies (13). Dumler-Winckler informs the reader that she offers an Aristotelian-Thomistic reading of Wollstonecraft, whereas other scholars offer a more Stoic or Platonic-Augustinian reading of her virtue theory (31). For that reason, it would have been helpful if Dumler-Winckler had more explicitly identified the excesses and deficiencies of each of the modern virtues she argues Wollstonecraft sets forth, since it is not always clear how these modern virtues are virtues in the Aristotelian-Thomist sense rather than just ways the
virtuous person would engage politics, society, and discourse within the context of the modern era.

The first chapter, “Dissenting Devotional Taste: The Virtues of Madness,” explicates Wollstonecraft’s conception of taste, contrasting it with those of Burke and Kant. For Wollstonecraft, judgments of taste are not disinterested; they encompass moral judgments as well as perceptual judgments, and judgments of preference (57). Part of the hallmark of a qualified judge or a person with the virtue of good taste is that she only submits to “legitimate authority” (54). Therefore, “virtues of madness” refers to how a true qualified judge with the virtue of good taste might appear mad by calling out and dissenting from illegitimate authority (36). In the second chapter, “Staging a Tragicomic Revolution: The Virtues of Ethical Conflict,” Dumler-Winckler uses the context of Wollstonecraft’s reflections on the French Revolution as well as her disagreements with Burke about the meaning of the French Revolution to explain how conflict is a Wollstonecraftian virtue insofar as it resists and seeks to reform structures of oppression and falsehood in just ways (83–84). Revolution is seen here as a corrective good, similar to the way dissent is seen as a corrective good in the previous chapter.

The third chapter, “Imitating Christ: Virtues and Sexed Semblances,” treats Wollstonecraft’s arguments against sexed virtues and her account of education and virtue formation, focusing on both the need for non-monolithic human moral exemplars and women to imitate God in an undistorted way. In the fourth chapter, “On Justice: Virtues and Rights,” Dumler-Winckler argues against other scholars, who interpret Wollstonecraft as seeing rights as prior to virtue (226). Dumler-Winckler argues that she rather sees rights as standards for justice and “stopgaps” against injustice, acting as a kind of mediation between law and virtue that could offer persons a sphere of protection or appeal if both law and virtue fail (227). The fifth chapter, “On Love: Virtues and Political Friendship,” discusses how friendship and love are not merely personal virtues for Wollstonecraft, but necessary political virtues if society is to truly be revolutionized and reformed in a way that does not simply devolve into varying cycles of despotism and oppression (295). Dumler-Winckler concludes the text by arguing that part of Wollstonecraft’s modern contribution to virtue theory is her recognition that “any adequate account of the virtues must acknowledge the ways systems and relations of domination distort our notions and thwart our efforts to cultivate virtues from the outset” (318).

Catherine Moon
Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture
University of Virginia