
The problem of conflict between spouses has remained a lacuna within the moral theology of marriage. *Just Marriage*, by Andrew Kim, seeks to address this void by applying principles of just war theory to the inevitable conflicts within the spousal relationship. Kim argues that war and conflicts antecedent to divorce share the common characteristic of a breakdown of normal relations, with the intentions of the actors demonstrated through their orientation towards unity and peace or destruction and dissolution (xx). The purpose of the book is thus to clarify the just forms of conflict within marriage by applying the principles of just war theory to the context of marriage (7–8).

The primary principle of just war theory is the limitation of conflict through its orientation towards reconciliation (xx). In defining the remaining principles as applied to marriage, Kim maintains this initial premise of orientation towards reconciliation between the spouses: the conflict is just when so oriented, unjust when not (15). The premise of proportionality demands that any conflict must be proportionate to the initial cause of the conflict, neither too great (and thus causing escalation) nor too little (46–47, 49). Further, spouses must only direct the conflict towards each other, although other family members, friends, and other interested parties may be involved as allies to the cause of reconciliation (61, 64). While either spouse has the authority to initiate conflict within the marriage, reconciliation may only occur with the assent of both spouses (68–69). Kim points out throughout the book that some conflicts must be simply dropped because they are not reconcilable at that moment—i.e., in the case of irreconcilable differences in values (35) or traits in their nature (36–40). In such cases of irreconcilability, the decision to suspend conflict and leave the matter unsettled for a time must be taken by both spouses together (73).

As mentioned above, Kim sees a similarity between war and marital conflicts which lead to divorce. To this end, the reconciliation described in *Just Marriage* seeks to present an alternative to both divorce and destructive marriages (7–8), an alternative which transforms destructive into perfective marriages. Even in perfective marriages, however, conflict remains an inherent aspect of the spousal relationship (18). This emerges from Kim’s underlying premise that, beginning with the Fall, there is a fundamental disunity between the sexes. Marriage is thus the primary theatre for conflict between the sexes as well as for healing the relationship between the sexes as a whole (24). The concept of ‘conflict’ invoked by Kim is thus quite wide. For destructive marriages, the idea of conflict aligns with the typical expectation of antagonism between opposing sides more intent
on harming the other than on helping. In perfective marriages, though, conflict takes on the character of challenging the spouse to live out their Christian vocation ever more completely. In applying the principles of just war theory to marriage, particularly the necessity of informing all conflict by the goal of reconciliation, Kim provides a framework for turning destructive marriages into perfective, and supporting perfective marriages in their continuing task of sanctification of the spouses.

_Just Marriage_ easily achieves its goal of demonstrating that the principles of just war theory can be illuminative when applied to moral questions beyond the context of armed conflict. Kim presents the book as representative of his own efforts in reflecting on just conflict in marriage, and as such is best described as an extended meditation. Yet the contribution of this book is by no means trivial. Kim has proven not only the applicability of just war theory to a wider range of moral questions, but especially to the insights which may be generated for considering conflict within marriage. To this latter point, _Just Marriage_ is a promising first step in exploring an aspect of marriage too long left unconsidered by so much moral theology.

MEGHAN BOWEN
Regis College (Toronto)


Lisa D. Powell’s _The Disabled God Revisited: Trinity, Christology, and Liberation_ takes both its name and inspiration from the late Nancy Eiesland’s landmark _The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability_ (1994). In that book, Eiesland reflects on the wounds of the crucified Christ retained after the resurrection in order to present her memorable image of the disabled God. Since its publication, many readers and critics have found Eiesland’s image of the disabled God provocative but theologically under-developed, and so in this book Powell turns to recent debates in trinitarian theology to elaborate a doctrine of God that supports a liberation theology of disability.

To present her own account of the disabled God, Powell draws upon the “covenant ontology” defended most notably by Bruce McCormack. According to McCormack’s interpretation of the theology of Karl Barth, _election_ has priority over _Trinity_. God’s decision to be a God of covenant has logical priority to and does not arise subsequently from God’s identity as triune. The consequence for Christology is that the second person of the Trinity simply is Jesus Christ. Rather than an abstract _logos asarkos_ “behind” the person of