

denies freedom to the other, can indeed issue in the loss of self of both parties, but it need not. The object of violence retains the power to respond, and in that response the full meaning of the event is constituted. Furthermore, far from having a negative valence, self-limitation is intrinsic to reality, both divine and finite. God is Trinity, and the divine persons are constituted in an eternal process of mutual love whereby each gives and receives self to the others. Divine being is a being-in-relation. With creation, God limits Godself in a different manner (riskily, for Eikrem), by opening a space for the freedom of finite others in order to extend the divine fellowship of love to them. Yet, there is sin, so with the Incarnation, God enters history. Throughout Jesus's career, God is unmasking and resisting the forces that oppose mutuality between God and human beings and among human beings. This resistance brings Jesus to the cross. *Coram hominibus*, Jesus is supremely victim, but even in his agony, the Son reaches out to the Father and the Spirit as he prays, "My God, my God." He prays as well for forgiveness for his persecutors, and in this exercise of his freedom, he both relativizes his victimhood and affirms the value of striving for mutual love for all. In responding to the Son and raising him from the dead, the Father and the Spirit demonstrate that not even death triumphs over God's eternal love. Death itself is taken up into that love. Empowered by divine love, Christians in turn offer themselves as sacrifices of praise, ritualized in Eucharist, as they strive to actualize the open, non-exclusive divine fellowship extended to them in the incarnate, crucified, and risen Christ.

If this is Eikrem's central vision, he offers much else of value. His survey of critiques of the soteriological tradition, especially those from feminists, is comprehensive, and in the course of his development of the notion of self-limitation, he delves richly into contemporary philosophers like Derrida and Levinas. At least two questions suggest themselves. First, is he claiming that, apart from his reconstruction, the soteriological tradition in its entirety is compromised? Second, is it true, as he asserts, that a metaphysics of substance is founded on an incoherent concept? Does this claim provide him the space within which to portray the Lord's Pasch as an event between God and God?

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Cooperation With Evil: Thomistic Tools of Analysis. By Kevin L. Flannery, S.J. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019. xi + 279 pages. \$34.95.

Is it morally acceptable to vote for a candidate who supports abortion, provided one does so in spite of this fact? Can an employer fund a health insurance policy that covers contraceptives so long as he or

she does not intend for the employees to use this coverage? These questions are familiar ones for Catholics in the US, and the manualist tradition's focus on the distinction between material and formal cooperation with evil as well as on the intention of those who so cooperate is at least implicit in our modes of argumentation. Kevin Flannery offers a compelling challenge to this approach. He argues that the Thomistic "toolbox" offers more sophisticated terms of analysis and helps us look beyond the intentions in our heads to the common good our actions must seek.

Flannery begins by showing the inadequacies of the approach to cooperation with evil found in St. Alphonsus Liguori and the subsequent manualist tradition. Most pointedly, Liguori uses Aquinas's theory of morally indifferent acts in order to clarify his own position on material cooperation and yet, as becomes even clearer in the later manualists, this ends up revealing the problems with his own analysis. In chapter 2, Flannery finds the answer to these problems by focusing on Aquinas's account of how circumstances factor into the morality of indifferent acts. Rather than focus on the intention of the cooperator, Aquinas looks at the broader issues of whether or not an action is consistent with reason, justice, and charity. Chapter 3 helps to clarify all of this via the issue of scandal: Alphonsus ignores all others affected by acts of cooperation as well as "how the actions performed relate to the ultimate end and order of the moral universe" (122).

Chapters 4 and 5 identify the other factors that must be brought to bear when looking at an act's relation to reason and justice. Chapter 4 begins with an analysis of factors concerning the voluntariness or involuntariness of an action, such as force and ignorance, and concludes with the five ways in which one's cooperation with injustice demands restitution. Chapter 5 shows the connection between intention, the paths of intelligibility, and the proportionality of an action to the "straight path of reason" (179). These factors are brought together in an analysis of two situations: 1) a judge who is bound by legal procedure to render an unjust verdict; 2) a person who is forced to accept a loan on usurious terms. Finally, chapter 6 shows the advantages of taking up Aquinas's understanding of "the objective and yet personal nature of justice," and yet also the challenges of doing so (204). Going beyond the manualist tradition's "Cartesian psychology ... [that relies on] an interior act of the mind which could be produced at will" makes our task more, not less, difficult (204). Further, a Thomistic approach relies upon the virtue of prudence and thus does not settle every moral difficulty in advance. Thus, Flannery does not offer us easy answers but rather an approach that allows us to put all of the relevant factors before ourselves.

Flannery does a fine job of arguing his case, and this book would be useful for researchers while also being accessible to advanced undergraduates. In the classroom setting, students would need a prior

background in Aquinas's moral theory as provided either by close reading of at least parts of the *Prima* and *Secunda Secundae* or of one of the many introductions to Aquinas's moral theory written in the last thirty or so years. Further, Flannery mentions that justice points to charity in moral analysis, but as a philosopher, his focus is only on justice. Thus, his work is in need of a supplement in light of how revelation deepens moral theory. Finally, while the reader may wish for Flannery to show us how a Thomistic analysis of cooperation can help us answer the pressing questions of our day concerning voting for pro-choice politicians or providing contraceptive coverage in health care policies, this is not his task; he offers us theory, not prudence, and we should appreciate his unwillingness to turn a work of moral philosophy into a work of moral ideology.

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Christian Character Formation: Lutheran Studies of the Law, Anthropology, Worship, and Virtue. By Gifford A. Grobien. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. xvii + 241 pages. \$90.00.

Professor Grobien's volume in the Oxford Studies in Theological Ethics series originates from his dissertation on moral theology at the University of Notre Dame. As the preface indicates, the volume attempts "to explain ethical formation in relationship to righteousness and worship" (xi) drawing primarily on sources from Luther and the Lutheran Confessions. Grobien intends the book to be a specifically Lutheran contribution to the field of virtue ethics and formation, bringing Lutheran sources primarily into dialogue with Stanley Hauerwas for ethics and Louis-Marie Chauvet for worship.

The book is divided into nine chapters, each of which could partially stand alone as they take on specific topics that somewhat build on one another. In this way, the book could easily be used in the classroom in its entirety or in sections. The downside is that the book has a choppy rather than integrated feel. Each chapter follows an orderly progression with helpful section headings.

Overall, Grobien stays consistent with a Lutheran understanding of the Law and righteousness, something he concretely states in the preface. He also draws on the seminal (albeit sometimes dated) commentators on Lutheran theology related to these topics. His fourth chapter on character formation is an attempt to respond to Hauerwas's critiques of Lutheranism by connecting formation to agency.

In the fifth chapter Grobien engages with the Finnish school of Luther studies to propose "union with Christ" as an approach to character formation: "Even in union with him, Christ does not compel the will