

Does Catholicism happen to accord agreeably with the author's experience and viewpoint, or does Catholicism call the author (and us) to such a view? Those opposed to the word "feminism" in the church might believe the author is forcing the fit, which is why beginning with the Catholic framework in future work would be an asset to those agreeing about the dignity of dependence.

Perhaps this seems an unfair criticism, given that the book was not marketed as theology, nor written by a theologian, despite it being reviewed in this theological journal. Thus, rather than extending additional criticism in such a vein, moral theologians ought to regard the book as an opening for complementary theological work and be willing to take up this important topic, where we certainly see a lacuna in our field.

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Tomorrow's Troubles: Risk, Anxiety, and Prudence in an Age of Algorithmic Governance. By Paul Scherz. Georgetown University Press, 2022. vii + 243. \$49.95 paperback.

Tomorrow's Troubles: Risk, Anxiety, and Prudence in an Age of Algorithmic Governance offers a profound contribution to ethical discourse on probabilistic predictive technologies that many institutions like hospitals, corporations, and governments use to manage risk. Risk management as a technique depends "on predictions based in probabilistic analysis" (1). People use probabilistic analysis to manage risk by attempting to predict all possible outcomes in order to eliminate those outcomes seen as bad. Despite how pervasive these predictive technologies have become in modernity, "relatively little work has been done on" decision theory and population-based governance in moral theology and religious ethics (4).

Tomorrow's Troubles sets out to bring "the distinctiveness of modern understandings of uncertainty" to reflective clarity to move toward richer and more extensive theological reflection on this pressing issue (17). Over the course of this book, Scherz argues that "dangers arise when probabilistic prediction expands beyond its appropriate domain and becomes a worldview" (6). This happens when "decision theory metastasizes from a useful model into the normative form of all practical reason, shaping a mistaken anthropology" (216). Inherent to the problem of a metastasized decision theory is thus a disordered relation to the future. *Tomorrow's Troubles* after all takes its name from the gospel verse: "Do not worry about tomorrow, for tomorrow will bring worries of its own. Today's trouble is enough" (Matthew 6:34, NRSV).

Tomorrow's Troubles comprises three parts with three to four short chapters in each. The three parts "mirror distinctions in probability theory itself": the subjectivist school, the objectivist school, and Scherz's proposal for a third founded in a Christian anthropology. Because of this, *Tomorrow's Troubles* could easily be read or excerpted for bioethics and technology ethics courses at both the undergraduate and graduate level.

Part I, "The Subjective Experience of Risk," considers how individual actors use probability, since the subjectivist school views probability as that which emerges from the individual subject and her own certainty or odds estimation. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to probability theory and its historical uniqueness by differentiating it from Aristotelean contingency. Chapter 2 connects the emergence of probability theory to decision theory as a prescriptive and normative mode of reasoning about human action over and against "ordinary prudential reasoning" (40). Chapter 3 addresses the nature of time as it relates to the being of human existence and notes how decision theory's mode of reasoning heightens anxiety and creates "anticipatory regret" in human subjects (14). Chapter 4 addresses one of the primary motivations behind using probability theory to manage risk: the desire for safety.

Part II, "The Governance of Others as Object of Risk," considers specific domains of action and objects since the objectivist school views probability as a property inherent in things and given situations. Chapter 5 tracks how the meaning of probability has developed and altered from the ancient and medieval periods up to the present. Chapter 6 addresses how views of political actors evolved with the advent of statistical analysis, with politicians viewed as more responsible for the consequences of actions and citizens seen as populations to be managed. Chapter 7 explores three concrete manifestations of probabilistic predictive technologies in modernity: labor management, nudging, and surveillance capitalism. Chapter 8 directly addresses the ethical problems of bias, manipulation, undermining autonomy, and an overall lack of respect for the human person as an image of God that surround the use of probabilistic predictive technologies for behavior analysis.

Addressing these problematic ways of thinking about probability and decision making, the book's Part III proposes a framework for thinking about how Christians should engage these technologies. Chapter 9 provides alternative accounts of responsibility from the Christian perspective that focus on what one is called to do in the present. Chapter 10 clarifies how Christians should practically approach these powerful probabilistic technologies, advocating not complete rejection but their use as aids to deliberation. Chapter 11 reflects on the myth of Prometheus, Wisdom Literature, and the social

significance of the Jubilee Year, noting that Scripture “argued fear of the Lord was the foundation of Wisdom” and thereby “did not aim at Promethean control but a harkening to the Law of God that directed the sage toward fulfilment” (206).

Scherz concludes that although “risk-based modes of practical reasoning are deeply embedded in contemporary subjectivity because of two hundred years of effort,” change, while difficult, is nonetheless possible and “requires regulation of technology and reshaping policymaking” as well as urging that “decision theory ceases to be the normative form of practical rationality” and that “individuals stop thinking and perceiving in these ways” (220). Ultimately, in Scherz’s view “trust in God can still provide a clear path toward ultimate certainty amid the confusion of life” (216).

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A Heaven for Animals: A Catholic Case and Why It Matters. By Christopher Steck, SJ. Washington, DC: Georgetown, 2025. x + 175. \$74.95 hardcover, \$24.95 paperback and ebook.

Christopher Steck’s book addresses an important question for those of us who care deeply for particular non-human animals: will we see them in heaven? Steck cogently argues that the answer to this question is “Yes.”

Steck begins by outlining the historical understanding of animals in Catholic theology before addressing reasons why our inherited views ought to change. For example, Aquinas, in *Summa Theologiae*, argued that “animals of the present age will not be in heaven” (13). For Aquinas, humans possess immortal souls while animals do not; following Aristotle, he believed humans’ natural capacity for reason was the crucial distinction. Their supposed lack of capacity for abstract reasoning entailed that animals, though composed of a sensitive soul and matter, could not be immortal (13–14).

After pointing out that the church or individual Christians are not necessarily beholden to Aquinas’s position, Steck highlights two theological arguments for it: first, animals, being created for the sake of humanity, will have no purpose in heaven; and second, animals, lacking capacity for spiritual contemplation, could not enjoy heaven. Using the same reasoning as Aquinas, Steck then suggests that creatures severely lacking in cognitive capacities may not be in heaven, but more developed ones, like the great apes, cetaceans, and others possessing demonstrable if limited cognitive capacities, could be in heaven (16–19). In sections two and three, Steck explores biblical and magisterial resources for affirming the presence of non-