discussing the process of conscience formation in consultation with Scripture, Tradition, reason, and experience, as well as highlighting key claims and developments in the documentary tradition that comprise CST. It is unfortunate that Shea's book spends more time citing lines from literary figures like G. K. Chesterton, John Donne, and C. S. Lewis than lifting out key passages from the CST canon. This white male-centric text misses a golden opportunity to help readers consider what it takes to enact CST as informed by exemplars like Sister Norma Pimentel, MJ, and her work with migrants and refugees in the Rio Grande Valley; Sister Helen Prejean, CSJ, and her tireless advocacy to abolish the death penalty; or how Sister Dorothy Stang, SNDdeN, gave her life in defense of the poor and the environment in Brazil. If CST will ever be anything but the church's "best-kept secret," then books like this one should shift their focus from condensing CST into four simple ideas and instead illuminate how CST can and does inspire agency from below and from above in a way that produces personal and communal flourishing. CST offers and demands much more than what is described here.

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*Wealth, Virtue, and Moral Luck: Christian Ethics in an Age of Inequality*. By Kate Ward. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2021. xii + 265 pages. $49.95.

Wealth, virtue, and inequality—each topic has been discussed at length by contemporary Christian ethicists. For example, Mary Hirschfeld covers private property and virtue in *Aquinas and the Market* (2018); Albino Barrera discusses unintended market externalities in *Economic Compulsion and Christian Ethics* (2009); and D. Stephen Long, in *Divine Economy: Theology and the Market* (2000), critiques political economies that arguably expand the gulf between rich and poor. Missing from these discussions, however, is a sustained treatment of the following idea: that life's circumstances—from one's racial identity to one's zipcode at birth—can affect moral development and, in particular, the formation of virtue. With admirable skill, Ward fills this gap.

Focusing upon the vicissitudes of economic life, Ward introduces the language of "moral luck" into Christian ethical discourse. She borrows the term from contemporary secular ethicists—including Martha Nussbaum, Claudia Card, and Lisa Tessman—but interprets it to highlight our "dependence on God for [the] pursuit of virtue" (87). In this sense, "moral luck"—insofar as it points to the chance circumstances of wealth and poverty—is "morally hortatory" (129). It encourages growth in "personal holiness" (by reflecting on how much

one actually needs to survive, for example) as well as "reform of unjust structures" (such as tackling regressive tax systems for the common good) (129).

Ward recognizes that the content of "moral luck" (that is, an attention to economic circumstance) is obviously not new to Christian ethical reflection. After all, Augustine and Aquinas feature in her constructive work. Nevertheless, Ward sees value in offering a "precise language" (140), one that will warn both the wealthy and the middle class (164) about the moral dangers of having too much.

Among this precise language is an important set of terms. First, and as mentioned above, "moral luck" stands in for, or represents, the idea of "life circumstances" (86). Within this term, Ward focuses upon situations of "wealth" and "poverty," respectively defined as "having more than we need" and "having to struggle to survive" (128). For Ward, these broad definitions cover all individuals (not just individuals who lie above or below a certain quantitative measure) and so are especially useful for Christian ethical reflection.

Next is the term hyperagency (134). In contrast to simple agency , hyperagency refers not only to one's ability to make moral decisions, but also to the astonishing extent to which one can control their own (and others') lives, particularly through wealth (134). While it was reserved "to a rare wealthy few" in centuries past, "wealthy hyperagency" (226), Ward notes, is common enough today "to pass as unremarkable" (139). Nevertheless, its ubiquity does not make it morally right. Indeed, hyperagency can distort key virtues—from prudence and justice to temperance and fortitude—by turning the wealthy in on themselves. The hyperagent, Ward writes, "walks a leisurely path lined with deceptively appealing diversions" (164). The poor are simply not seen.

And so, the precise and particular use of language features importantly in Ward's book and thus serves its underlying moral pedagogy which relies in part upon defining moral terms with reference to "anthropological truth claims" (47). However, the book's virtue ethical dimension comes out most clearly through Ward's use of virtuous exemplars. She tells the remarkable stories of individuals who, by rejecting the vices of hyperagency, create conditions in which wealth is shared with the poor. Dorothy Day and other exemplars that are common to Catholic social teaching are praised. And more obscure, but no less impressive exemplars, such as "The Duke Collective," a group of graduate students who shared their incomes in a common fund (59), and "The Four Churchwomen of El Salvador," martyrs who left lives of privilege to help the poor (62), are introduced. These examples inspire us—the educated wealthy, the "primary readers of this work" (218)—to use our wealth to encounter

and serve those in genuine need. With Ward's most welcome language (228), we can have meaningful conversations on how exactly to do so.

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*Athena to Barbie: Bodies, Archetypes, and Women's Search for Self.* By J. Lenore Wright. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2021. xv + 204 pages. $32.00.

J. Lenore Wright's *Athena to Barbie* is a re-theorization of pregnancy as it appears in four famous Western archetypes of woman: Mary, Athena, Venus, and Barbie. By assessing the liberating and constraining potential of these four archetypes, Wright invites women to construct empowering experiences of pregnancy for themselves, paving the way for conscious, agential appropriation of archetypal experiences. Though jargon threatens its clarity at times, *Athena to Barbie* is an accessible example of interdisciplinary research. The work draws together theology, philosophy, critical theory, art criticism and history, and incorporates visual data via numerous color reproductions of pertinent art pieces.

In Chapter 1, Wright explores the Marian archetype, emphasizing womb as sacred space. Her Mariology is a liberal, Protestant one and Catholic readers may balk when she describes Mary as a "passive, generic vessel" (14) whose "rational assent to the Holy Spirit is … secondary to her physical assent" (23). At the same time, she rightfully argues for the need of more archetypes of female dominance and authority, noting that certain construals of the Virgin Mary have hampered women's appropriation of their own agency. She concludes that the archetypical Marian pregnancy is a passive reception of the sacred other.

Wright's strongest chapter, Chapter 2, explores the goddess Athena. Athena's archetypical pregnancy involves physical virginity for the sake of birthing the polis. For Athena, pregnancy is a creative birthing of ideas. Yet this archetype contains a warning: Athena's birthing of ideas comes at the expense of her femininity. She suppresses her female body in order to bring her fecundity to a man's political world. Wright asserts that this image of female intellectual fertility is one that has long been sorely lacking in the Western imagination, while arguing that new paths must be forged, granting women space to birth ideas without eschewing embodied femininity.

Chapter 3 introduces Venus's erotic womb. Venus uses fertile sexuality as a domesticating influence on male violence. For Venus, wombed subjectivity can be both sacred and civilizing (67). Yet, when the Venus archetype was appropriated by the medical establishment in the development of wax "anatomical Venuses" for surgical study, the